Searching for the Origins of Civic Community in the Newly Expanded European Union. Jean Monnet/Robert Schumann Paper Series Vol. 4 No. 18, December 2004 by Davidson-Schmich, Louise K.
 
 
  
   
   
Robert Schuman
Searching for the Origins of Civic Community 
in the Newly Expanded European Union
 
- Louise K. Davidson-Schmich 
 
 
 
  Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 4  No. 18 
December 2004
   
 
This publication is sponsored by the EU Commission. 
   
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in 
cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer 
of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the 
European Union.  While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the 
European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its 
objectives at home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, 
the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process.  In order for efficiency and progress to 
prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of 
this organization.  As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze 
various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How did the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to 
understand each other?  Under what conditions? 
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
 
Miami European Union Center        Jean Monnet Chair Staff: 
University  of  Miami      Joaquín  Roy  (Director) 
1000  Memorial  Drive      Aimee  Kanner  (Editor) 
101 Ferré Building           Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant) 
Coral Gables, Fl. 33124-2231        Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant) 
Phone:  305-284-3266; Fax: 305-284-4406    Markus Thiel (Research Assistant) 
Email:  jroy@miami.edu    Wendy  Grenade  (Associate  Editor) 
Web:  www.miami.edu/eucenter     Eloisa  Vladescu  (Editorial  Assistant)  
Searching for the Origins of Civic Society 
in the Newly Expanded European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Louise K. Davidson-Schmich* 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jean Monnet Chair 
University of Miami 
Miami, Florida 
December 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
______ 
*Louise K. Davidson-Schmich is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Miami, USA. She is the author of Becoming Party Politicians: East German State Legislators in the Decade 
Following Democratization, forthcoming from the University of Notre Dame Press. She has published in The 
Journal of Legislative Studies, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, German Politics and Society, Il Politico, 
and Politische Vierteljahresschrift.  
  
 
 
 
1
 
Searching for the Origins of Civic Community  
in the Newly Expanded European Union
φ
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although many scholars stress the importance of a civic political culture for a functioning democracy, 
there is little consensus about where such a culture originates. The ‘bottom up’ approach argues that the 
civic culture has centuries old, enduring roots that in turn shape political and economic institutions. The 
‘top down’ approach implies that political culture itself can be shaped by political institutions. Both 
schools of thought, however, stress the interrelatedness of civic behaviors; voluntary group membership, 
newspaper readership, and voting are expected to all be high in civic cultures and low elsewhere. In 
contrast, this article argues that these four components of  ‘civicness’ are differently influenced by 
contemporary political institutions and are therefore less interrelated than previous scholars have 
hypothesized.  
 
Germany and its neighbors in a newly expanded EU provide an excellent laboratory in which to 
empirically investigate these conflicting hypotheses about the origin of the civic community. If the 
‘bottom up’ approach were correct, there would be no differences in the level of civic community 
between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany and Central Europe since they were separated by the 
Iron Curtain for only four decades. If the ‘top down’ approach were correct, forty years of communist rule 
would have indeed reduced the level of civic community in Eastern Germany and Eastern Central Europe. 
Instead, I find marked differences in voluntary group membership across the former Iron Curtain, but 
much less divergence in terms of newspaper readership and voter turnout.  
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Introduction 
 
A significant strand of the literature on democracy and democratization stresses the importance 
of a civic political culture to a functioning democracy.
1 Within this literature, however, there is 
little consensus about where such a culture originates. Some observers, taking a ‘bottom up’ 
approach, argue that the civic culture has centuries old, enduring roots that in turn shape political 
and economic institutions.
2 Others, who take a ‘top down’ approach, imply that political culture 
itself can be shaped by political institutions. This school of thought is prominent among scholars 
who study Eastern Europe and stress the impact that communism had on civic culture.
3  
 
This tension also manifests itself in Robert Putnam’s seminal Making Democracy Work.
4 
In it, Putnam studied the varying performance of regional governments across Italy and 
attributed differences in government performance to the presence or absence of what he termed 
civic community. Such communities, he argued, are characterized by a high density of voluntary 
associations, high levels of newspaper readership, and high voter turnout, both in elections and 
for referenda. Putnam believed these mutually-reinforcing factors create the feelings of trust, 
efficacy, and life satisfaction that are conducive to democracy. Like the literature on political 
culture as a whole, however, Putnam's work is ambiguous about the origins of the civic 
community. For the bulk of the book, Putnam argued that it had centuries-old roots, but later in 
Making Democracy Work he also argued that civic community can change over a matter of 
decades if political institutions change. His work therefore embodies the two, mutually-
exclusive, schools of thought about the origins of civic community. Both schools, however, 
stress that the components of the civic community are highly correlated. 
 
In this article I argue that both of these schools of thought incorrectly assess the ability of 
political institutions to shape civic community. The ‘bottom up’ approach underestimates the 
ability of political institutions to influence civicness whereas the ‘top down’ approach fails to 
distinguish how the different components of civic community are differently influenced by 
political change. By disaggregating the components of civic community, we can paint a more 
nuanced picture of its origin.  
 
If a civic political culture is indeed essential for the functioning of democracy, then 
understanding its origin is of vital importance. If it is centuries-old and basically immutable there 
is little policy makers can do to promote democratization in contexts with low levels of 
civicness. In contrast, if political institutions do shape civic community, there are steps that 
policy makers can take to promote levels of civicness and ultimately improve democratic 
performance. If the components of civicness are differently influenced by political institutions, 
however, understanding these differences will help policymakers know where to target their 
resources in order to increase the aspects of civic community that they can influence in pursuit of 
a working democracy.  
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Germany and its neighboring countries in the European Union provide an excellent 
laboratory in which to empirically investigate the origin of the civic community.
5 If civic 
community is indeed centuries old, there should be no differences in the level of civic 
community between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany since they were separated by the 
Iron Curtain for only four decades.
6 Germans in both halves of the country should exhibit the 
same levels of civicness as their German-speaking neighbors in other countries.
7 If civic 
community can change from decade to decade, forty years of communist rule would have likely 
reduced the level of civic community in Eastern Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Central 
Europe. If the different components of civic culture are differently sensitive to political change, 
however, we would expect to see mixed levels of civicness across the different indicators in each 
region. In this article, I examine whether or not differing levels of associational membership, 
newspaper readership, and voter turnout in general elections and referenda are present in the two 
parts of Germany and its Central European neighbors. 
 
Contrary to the expectation that these indicators of the civic community are closely 
interrelated, I find marked differences in voluntary group membership across the former Iron 
Curtain, but much less systematic divergence in terms of newspaper readership and voter 
turnout. The different components of the civic community, then, are differently influenced by 
political change. To develop this conclusion, I first discuss the concept of civic community and 
the debate about its origin. Next, I derive some testable hypotheses vis-à-vis Germany and 
Central Europe. I then empirically examine levels of civic community across Germany and seven 
neighboring countries and find the above-mentioned mixed results. I conclude by calling for a 
more nuanced understanding of the origins of civic community and discussing the policy 
implications of my findings for the consolidation of democracy.  
 
The Concept of Civic Community 
 
In this article I rely on the definition of civic community put forth by Robert Putnam. He 
explains the difference in government performance between northern and southern Italy in the 
following way:  
Some regions of Italy have many choral societies and soccer teams and bird-watching 
clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in those regions read eagerly about community 
affairs in the daily press. The are engaged by public issues .... They believe in popular 
government, and they are predisposed to compromise with their political adversaries. ... 
The community values solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation, and honesty. 
Government works. ... At the other pole are the ‘un-civic’ regions... public life is 
organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally.... From the point of view of the 
individual inhabitant, public affairs is the business of somebody else.... Political 
participation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by collective 
purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. ... All things  
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considered, it is hardly surprising that representative government here is less effective 
than in more civic communities.
8 
 
He argues that four factors, including ‘the vibrancy of associational life
9,’ newspaper 
readership
10, and voting behavior, including turnout in both general elections and referenda
11, 
help promote a range of civic attitudes within the population, including feelings of life 
satisfaction, trust in others and in government, a feeling of political efficacy rather than a belief 
in clientelism, and support for political equality. These civic attitudes are held to be highly 
conducive to a functioning democracy. 
 
The importance of associational life for democracy has long been recognized.
12 When 
citizens band together to achieve common goals, whether it be putting on a choral concert, 
organizing a soccer tournament, or ‘adopting’ a littered highway to clean up, they are influenced 
in ways which go beyond music, sports, or aesthetics. They learn to trust their fellow citizens, a 
vital component of representative democracy. Further, citizens gain a feeling of efficacy; they 
learn that they can organize and work together to achieve common goals in much the way 
interest groups and political parties can come together to influence public life. The 
organizational and communication skills that citizens develop in voluntary organizations can be 
used in other realms to transmit demands to political leaders. Further, contacts with like-minded 
fellow citizens or elites which may occur in voluntary associations provide individuals with an 
opportunity to discuss public issues. These types of horizontal communication networks help 
elected officials learn what their constituents want and act on their demands. Citizens can trust 
that government will work in their interests and, as a result, they will be more satisfied with their 
government. 
 
The importance of newspaper readership for a well-functioning polity has also long been 
asserted. As Tocqueville put it, ‘only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time 
before a thousand readers.... So hardly can any democratic association carry on without a 
newspaper
13’. The higher the number of newspaper readers, the more likely citizens are to be 
informed about public issues, to develop and discuss opinions about these issues, and to 
communicate their preferences to elected officials. Informed citizens are likely to feel efficacious 
and leaders are more likely to know what their constituents want. As a result, communities with 
a high level of newspaper readership are likely to report a high level of satisfaction with 
government.  
 
In addition to joining associations and reading newspapers, citizens in the civic 
community should be willing to participate in more overtly political actions such as voting in 
general elections or for referenda. Voting is one of the primary mechanisms through which 
citizens can communicate their policy preferences to elected officials. Citizens who actively take 
part in elections should be more likely to feel satisfied with the actions taken by their elected 
representatives. Referenda voting provides citizens with an even more specific opportunity to 
communicate their opinions on critical issues. As Putnam argues, ‘the primary motive of the  
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referendum voter is concern for public issues
14’. Democracy is more likely to work when citizens 
are willing to express opinions on the political issues of the day. Thus higher citizen satisfaction 
with government should occur in communities where referenda turnout is high.  
 
 
In a civic community, then, citizens are hypothesized to get to know each other through 
cooperation in voluntary organizations, read the newspaper to find out what is going on in their 
community, and react to events by expressing opinions in elections and referenda. As a result of 
their engagement, citizens often believe that others are trustworthy and that government is 
effective. These expectations will generally be met – creating a virtuous circle. In ‘un-civic’ 
communities, it is hypothesized, citizens do not learn to cooperate with others in voluntary 
associations, remain uninformed about current events, and rather than voting in elections and 
referenda rely on patronage and clientelism. These citizens tend to distrust each other and are 
dissatisfied with their government. Their expectations are also likely to be met – creating a 
vicious circle. Putnam hypothesizes that these patterns are ‘self-reinforcing and cumulative,’ 
creating ‘two broad equilibria toward which all societies … tend to evolve
15’. Another prominent 
student of the civic culture agrees, defining it as a ‘coherent syndrome’ of traits.
16 The logic of 
these arguments implies that all components of civic community (voluntary organizations, 
newspaper readership, and voter turnout) will either all be common or all be scarce in a given 
community.   
 
 
The Origins of the Civic Community 
 
While the virtues of civic community and its self-reinforcing nature are generally agreed upon, 
its origins are more disputed in the literature. The disagreement in this area can be illustrated by 
the tension over the origins of the civic community in Making Democracy Work. On the one 
hand, Putnam argues that the groundwork for today’s civic northern Italy and un-civic southern 
Italy was laid in the 1100s.
17 This centuries old view of civic community is similar to the 
approach to political culture taken by such prominent scholars as Max Weber and Ronald 
Inglehart.
18 On the other hand, however, the last few pages of Putnam’s book add a new 
dimension to his arguments. There the author claimed, a ‘second lesson of the regional 
experiment is ... that changing formal institutions can change political practices’ but that ‘time is 
measured in decades. This ... will be true of the ex-Communist states of Eurasia even in the most 
optimistic scenarios
19’. This view is today echoed by many students of post-communist countries 
who stress the depressing legacy of communism on Eastern European political culture.
20 
 
Thus there are two mutually exclusive hypotheses about the origins of civic community: 
The ‘bottom up’ approach believes the level of civicness in a given community has deep 
historical roots that do not change from century to century regardless of political change. The 
‘top down’ approach, in contrast, argues that the level of civicness in a certain place can vary 
from decade to decade as political institutions change. In either case, however, both hypotheses  
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imply that, because the four components of civic community are mutually reinforcing, all four 
should be equally (un)likely to change.  
 
I believe, however, that there are several reasons to expect that associational 
membership, newspaper readership, and voter turnout are not as interlinked as the conventional 
wisdom implies. Some components of civic community are more likely to be responsive to 
changes in political institutions than others, meaning that at any given time, a community may 
simultaneously score high on some indicators of civic community and low on others. Below I 
discuss each component of the civic community in turn, from the least time consuming (voting in 
general elections and referenda) to the most time consuming (joining a voluntary group).  
 
Voting 
 
Compared to other facets of civic behavior, voting in an election or in a referendum involves the 
least amount of commitment on the part of a citizen. While voluntary groups require dues and 
newspapers have subscription fees, there is no charge for voting. While newspapers arrive daily 
and associations meet regularly, in most countries national elections and referenda occur only 
every few years. The act of voting only takes a few minutes. Thus the decision to vote – or not – 
does not represent a major investment for most citizens and is therefore subject to short term 
influences, hence poll watchers often predict that bad weather will depress voter turnout.  
 
The literature on voting in established democracies also indicates that voter turnout is 
strongly influenced by political institutions.
21 For example, turnout is routinely found to be lower 
in plurality than in proportional representation electoral systems. Among countries using PR, 
Switzerland stands out for its low voter turnout. The Swiss constitution mandates both that key 
decisions be made via referendum and that seats in its seven-member executive be reserved for 
members of specific political parties; this institutional configuration reduces the importance of 
voting in general elections to otherwise civic-minded citizens and depresses voter turnout.
22   
 
In Eastern Europe, turnout in almost all communist elections approached 100%, as did 
the number of votes for communist parties. Under communism, taking part in elections, as well 
as in the few early referenda which were held, was far from voluntary, however. Citizens were 
required to vote and, if they did not appear at the polls, officials often voted for them. Proponents 
of the ‘top down’ approach to the origins of civic community argue that these experiences have 
made citizens in post-communist countries cynical about the value of voting and expect that 
Eastern Europeans may view democracy as the freedom not to participate in elections.
23  
 
However, while voting in communist-era elections was coerced and offered citizens no 
political influence, the introduction of free elections after 1989 changed the meaning of Eastern 
European elections overnight. Citizens' calculus about the merits of voting likely changed just as 
quickly. Elsewhere in the world high levels of voter turnout have observed the first time a 
democratic election is held
24, and there seems to be little reason why Eastern Europeans should  
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respond any differently. Because voting in an election or referenda is not a time consuming 
commitment, it is likely to be the component of civic community that most quickly responds to 
political changes. As a result, I expect voter turnout to differ across Central Europe on the basis 
of current political institutions rather varying than along Cold War lines or remaining uniform in 
Central Europe as a result of deep seated cultural factors. In other words, I agree that voter 
turnout has ‘top down’ origins, but I believe this component of the civic community is more 
sensitive to political change than others have implied. 
Newspaper Readership 
 
Newspaper readership represents an intermediate case between voting and associational 
membership, both in terms of sensitivity to political institutions and in terms of time 
commitment. While voting is free, subscribing to or purchasing a newspaper has (albeit minimal) 
financial costs. Furthermore, while voting takes only a few minutes every few years, regular 
newspaper readership takes at least some time everyday. Thus it is more likely to become a habit 
(or not) and is less subject to short term changes – political or otherwise – than voting is. For 
example, the Newspaper Association of America has tracked the average weekday newspaper 
readership in the United States for decades, and since 1980 the percentage of Americans reading 
a weekday newspaper has never changed by more than 2% from year to year. Habits can, and do, 
change over time, however. With the advent of cable news, internet, and other instantaneous 
outlets for news, newspaper readership has gradually declined not only in the United States, but 
in the advanced industrial countries as a whole.
25 Similarly, newspaper publication and 
readership only initially emerged in Germany over an extended period of time in the late 
1700s.
26 
 
Proponents of the ‘top down’ approach to the origins of civic community suggest that the 
communist period depressed newspaper readership. While censorship was rampant in East 
Central Europe during the Cold War, Western Europeans have had access to a free press for 
decades. Since World War II, West Germany has had a range of local daily newspapers as well 
as ones with national appeal, such as the Frankfurter Rundschau and Die Süddeutsche Zeitung. 
Readers can also choose from many news weeklies such as Die Zeit. Furthermore, the country is 
home to a number of tabloid newspapers such as the Bild Zeitung. The situation has been the 
same in Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland since World War II. Under communism in contrast, 
Eastern Europeans, including Eastern Germans, had a much more limited choice of newspapers. 
The German Democratic Republic’s main national paper, Neues Deutschland, as well as local 
dailies such as the Berliner Zeitung and the Ostsee Zeitung, were closely censored by the 
government. The same was true of the widely circulated Junge Welt, a paper targeted at students 
and other young people. Reading a newspaper was often not an accurate way to learn more about 
current political controversies or the opinions of one’s fellow citizens; in contrast to western 
countries, citizens had to rely on other sources than the mass media to keep abreast with news 
events.
27 These experiences are now hypothesized to have curtailed Eastern Europeans’ habit of 
reading newspapers.
28  
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However, while communist-era censorship may have dampened Eastern Europeans' 
enthusiasm for reading newspapers prior to 1989, the end of the communist party monopoly on 
news in the early 1990s soon provided citizens with a completely different set of news outlets. 
The introduction of the freedom of the press, combined with laws allowing the financing and 
formation of new publications, created a boom in new and improved papers in the decade after 
the fall of communism.
29  Those previously not interested in reading a daily paper may have 
changed their minds when tempted by colorful new options at the newsstand. After the fall of 
communism, reading a daily paper likely became an attractive option to many Eastern 
Europeans. While newspaper readership is unlikely to have dramatically increased immediately 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, over the course of a decade the civic habit of reading the paper 
will have had time to develop. Thus I expect little East-West variance in terms of newspaper 
readership. Here again, I believe a component of the civic community has top down origins, but I 
believe it more quickly responds to changed political institutions than is currently hypothesized. 
 
Associational Membership 
 
Of all of the indicators of civic community, associational membership represents the greatest 
investment in terms of resources and time. Associations often require dues to join and 
membership meetings and activities last far longer than voting or reading the daily news. 
Furthermore, joining a group such as a bowling league or bird watching club involves face-to-
face interactions with others. Thus, the decision to drop out of a social body is a much bigger one 
than deciding not to purchase a newspaper on a given day or to stay home from the polls once 
every few years. As a result, associational membership is the component of the civic community 
that is the least sensitive to political change or short term fluctuation. 
 
Under communism, societal interests were highly organized in state-run associations, 
such as trade unions, women’s associations, and youth organizations. These groups, however, 
were organized from the top down and membership was often coerced or at least highly 
encouraged,
30 hence the groups which did exist could hardly be considered voluntary 
organizations. Furthermore, because of their hierarchical organization, these groups did little to 
build horizontal ties among citizens, a central characteristic of a civic community. Current 
proponents of the ‘top down’ approach argue that these negative experiences with forced 
participation will leave a long-term distrust and avoidance of voluntary groups in Eastern Central 
Europe.
31 
 
This legacy is compounded by contemporary logistical issues. Because communists 
banned truly voluntary groups, and because most communist-sponsored groups disappeared after 
1989, few voluntary associations existed when democracy was introduced in Eastern Central 
Europe. As a result, citizens interested in joining such a group would have had to start their own 
– clearly much more of an investment in terms of time and possibly money than simply reading a 
newspaper or dropping by a polling place. While founding a voluntary organization is a major 
undertaking in the best of circumstances, the post-communist transition to the market economy  
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has disrupted people’s lives, making it difficult for them to find the time or energy to participate 
in voluntary groups
32, let alone start one. Further, changing conditions may make some citizens 
unsure of what their interests and preferences actually are.
33 Thus, even if a voluntary group 
manages to form, it still may not find many members. To join, individuals must make the time 
commitment to attending activities as well as make the financial commitment of paying dues. 
Both resources will be scarce in a society undergoing rapid political and economic change.  
 
Voluntary groups, once destroyed, are time-consuming and costly to recreate, meaning 
that even after the freedom to form autonomous associations was restored in East Central 
Europe, voluntary groups will likely be slow to (re)emerge. In contrast, Western Europeans have 
been free to join a range of voluntary organizations for decades. Today these organizations are 
well established, citizens clearly know their interests, and have the resources to join. Thus, as the 
‘top down’ approach expects, we will likely observe stark East-West Central European 
differences in terms of voluntary group membership.  
 
Expectations  
 
In sum, if the roots of civic community lie far in the past, as the ‘bottom up’ hypothesis implies, 
there should be no differences in the level of civicness across Eastern and Western Germany 
today. If the roots of civic community truly are centuries old, the brief forty year division of the 
region should have no impact on contemporary citizen behavior. Similarly, other German-
speaking countries or areas of Central Europe historically governed by German speakers should 
have the same degree of civicness as Germans do.
34 Voluntary group membership, newspaper 
readership, and voting in elections and referenda should not vary greatly across Germany nor 
across the Iron Curtain.  
 
According to the current ‘top down’ line of reasoning, in contrast, the forty year division 
of Germany and Central Europe into communist and non-communist parts should have altered 
the levels of civic community across the two sides of the Iron Curtain. As a result of forty years 
of communism, associational membership, newspaper readership, and voter turnout in general 
elections and referenda should all be lower in Eastern Germany and East Central Europe than in 
Western Germany and West Central Europe. 
 
Both of the above hypotheses expect that the levels of associational membership, 
newspaper readership, and voter turnout observed should be equally high or low in the two 
halves of Germany and the adjoining Central European countries. These factors are expected to 
be interdependent, building either a virtuous or a vicious cycle of (un)civic community. In 
contrast, I expect that different components of civic community are differently influenced by 
political institutions. Associational membership is less likely to experience short-term 
fluctuations as political institutions change. In contrast, voter turnout in elections and referenda 
may change almost as quickly as electoral rules can be rewritten. Newspaper readership should 
also gradually respond to changes in rules governing freedom of the press. In Central Europe,  
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then, associational membership should vary along the lines of the Iron Curtain whereas voter 
turnout and newspaper readership should not differ systematically from East to West but instead 
vary from country to country depending on current political institutions. As a result, rather than 
uniform patterns of ‘civicness’ across countries, I expect mixed results within countries.  
 
An Empirical Investigation 
Here I evaluate how these expectations perform using empirical evidence from Germany and 
seven neighboring countries (Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia) about the four components of the civic community: voter turnout in 
elections and referenda, newspaper readership, and associational life. The German case is akin to 
the ‘experiment[al]’ conditions Putnam enjoyed in Italy
35 in that it allows me to hold constant a 
number of factors that might influence civic community, including institutional and, for the most 
part, economic factors. While the individuals in Eastern and Western Germany spent four 
decades under two very different political regimes, today they are all citizens of the Federal 
Republic. As a result, the laws governing the incorporation of voluntary groups, the newspapers 
available, and the electoral laws are identical across Germany. Because formal institutions are 
held constant, this factor can be ruled out as the cause of the variance in civic community. 
Moreover, since unification the federal government has spent billions of Euros trying to revive 
the Eastern German economy and infrastructure. In keeping with Germany's tradition as a social 
market economy, extensive welfare and job creation programs were implemented. While 
economic differences continue between Eastern and Western Germans, roughly half of the 
citizens in both halves of the country assess their personal financial situation as ‘very good’ or 
‘good’.
36 Similarly, multivariate analysis indicates that the remaining economic differences 
among Eastern and Western Germans cannot completely explain differences in life satisfaction, a 
variable closely linked to civic culture and satisfaction with democracy.
37 The other Central 
European countries do not have the advantage of these controls, but are incorporated nonetheless 
in order to assess the generalizability of the German case. 
 
Voter Turnout in General Elections and Referenda 
 
Table 1 depicts the average voter turnout in Central European national elections held between 
1990 and 2004. As expected, no statistically significant East-West Central European differences 
were observed. Long-democratic Switzerland, with its consociational parliament and frequent 
use of referenda, had the lowest voter turnout whereas post-communist Slovakia, with its highly 
proportional electoral system, had one of the highest turnouts in the region. When Eastern and 
Western German voter turnout in the four national elections held since unification is compared, 
weakly significant differences do appear. While western turnout is higher, 80% compared to 
75% in Eastern Germany, this five percentage point difference pales in comparison to the 42% 
gulf between Danish and Swiss voter turnout.  
 
Voter turnout in referenda followed a somewhat similar pattern (See Table 2). National-
level referenda are constitutionally prohibited in Germany. They are permitted at the state level,  
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however, and thirty such democratic referenda have been held since World War II. Most were 
held in the 1990s, but in order to increase my sample size, I measured turnout in all state level 
referenda held in (West) Germany since 1948. Eastern referenda turnout (56.1%) was actually 
higher than western referenda turnout (52.9%), although these differences were not statistically 
significant. Table 2 also compares turnout in democratically-held national referenda across the 
rest of Central Europe between 1945 and 2004; here I find only weakly significant differences. 
The western countries of Austria and Denmark had the highest voter turnout in referenda but 
were followed by areas east of the Iron Curtain including Eastern Germany and the Czech 
Republic. Further down the list, Switzerland and Poland had similar referenda turnout. Thus, as 
expected, no clear ‘Iron Curtain’ emerged in terms of this component of the civic community. 
 
 
Newspaper Readership  
 
The National Federation of German Newspaper Publishers (Bundesverband Deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger or BDZV) routinely tracks newspaper readership across Germany. (See Table 
3.) Their research found that initially after unification, Eastern Germans had a significantly 
higher rate of newspaper readership than their western counterparts. This continued throughout 
the 1990s; in 1996, 74.8% of Eastern Germans read a daily newspaper compared to 70% of 
westerners. In 2001 for the first time the figures reversed, with 73% of Western Germans 
compared to 71.7% of Eastern Germans reading a daily. By 2004 the eastern figure remained 
constant but the western figure rose to 77.2%. These differences are not statistically significant, 
however. Today both Eastern and Western Germans live in a similar media market with identical 
laws governing the freedom of the press, and read newspapers at roughly similar rates.  
 
The decline in Eastern Germans’ engagement with the news over the fifteen years since 
unification may be due to the nature of the news that is available in post-unification Germany. 
Eastern Germans are a minority within Germany and most major news outlets are owned and 
dominated by western Germans. As a result, the news is biased toward western concerns and 
often overlooks or even belittles Easterners.
38 Because they feel ignored in the national media, 
Eastern Germans do not subscribe to national newspapers as often as Westerners. They do, 
however, frequently read regional newspapers and the tabloid Super Illu, specifically targeted at 
an Eastern German audience, sells more than 600,000 copies a week to a population of 15 
million.
39 This trend underscores the sensitivity of newspaper readership to current political 
conditions and suggests support for a gradual ‘top down’ origin for this component of the civic 
community.  
 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
systematically tracks newspaper circulation across the globe. Table 4 shows the average number 
of daily newspapers circulated in Central Europe per 1000 citizens in 1996-97; the data for 
Germany was not disaggregated along East-West lines.
40 Here again, no statistically significant 
East-West Central European pattern emerges. The number of daily newspapers circulated is  
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much higher in Hungary and Switzerland than in Austria or Poland. These findings are 
especially striking given that that more than one person may read a given newspaper. Because 
incomes in East Central Europe are lower than those in West Central Europe, people in the 
former region are less likely to have their own newspaper subscription and more likely to share a 
newspaper with family members, colleagues, or friends, driving down the number of papers sold 
without reducing the percent of the population reading dailies. Given these reading habits, it 
seems likely that newspaper readership in the region may be even more similar to that in west 
Central Europe than the UNESCO data implies. Thus, as expected, newspaper readership has a 
‘top down’ origin that, over the course of a decade, responded to the political changes in East 
Central Europe as communism crumbled and a free press emerged. 
 
 
 
Associational Life     
 
In contrast to voting and newspaper readership, however, there were marked differences between 
both Eastern and Western Germans' and Europeans' involvement with voluntary organizations. 
The German Statistical Yearbook routinely measures membership in sports clubs and choral 
societies across Germany. Table 5 shows that between 1991 and 2002 Eastern citizens remained 
significantly less likely to be involved with these kind of voluntary groups than their western 
neighbors. While 28% of western Germans were a member of a sports organization in 1990, only 
11% of their Eastern counterparts were; this gap actually widened slightly in the subsequent 
decade. Similarly, while 2.5% of Western Germans were members of non-church choirs in 2002, 
only 0.3% of Easterners were. This weakness of associational life has been found in numerous 
other studies of German citizens,
41 across types of voluntary organizations.
 42 Some observers 
have found these differences replicated at the elite level as well.
43 In sum, Eastern Germans are 
significantly less involved in voluntary groups than their Western German counterparts. 
 
When the scope of the analysis is broadened to a comparison of Germany's neighbors, 
similar differences are found along the lines of the former Iron Curtain. Finding membership 
figures in comparable voluntary groups across eight countries is difficult. However, in all of the 
countries examined the national statistical office collects data on membership in sports clubs. 
Table 6 shows the number of members in registered sports organizations as a percentage of the 
total population in each country.
44 The results show clear Eastern-Western European differences. 
Sports club membership is highest in those countries that found themselves on the western side 
of the Iron Curtain; approximately one third of Austrians, western Germans, Danes, and the 
Swiss are members of a sports organization. In contrast, former Soviet bloc countries have far 
less active sports associations. Only 24% of Czechs, 12% of Eastern Germans, 6% of Slovaks, 
4.6% of Hungarians, and a mere 1.0% of Poles are members of official sports clubs. This finding 
is consistent with many studies of the weakness of civil society in post-communist Eastern 
Europe.
45  
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In terms of sports club membership Eastern Germans tend to resemble more their Eastern 
neighbors, and Western Germans more their Western neighbors, than Germans from different 
sides of the Berlin Wall resemble each other. In this regard, then, decades of communist have 
had a ‘top-down’ dampening on associational membership that even a decade of democracy has 
not been able to undo. 
 
Discussion 
 
Thus, in contrast to the conventional wisdom on civic community, not all components of 
‘civicness’ were closely interlinked. Contrary to the expectations of the ‘bottom up’ hypothesis, 
for example, no clear national patterns emerged. Swiss voters rarely vote but they avidly follow 
the newspaper. Over 80% of Slovaks turn out for national elections but only a fraction of that 
percentage are willing to join a sports club. And in contrast to today’s popular ‘top down’ 
hypothesis, no clear cut East-West pattern of newspaper readership or voting was found. This 
evidence clearly shows that the components of civic community are not always interrelated, 
challenging one of the core assumptions of the literature on civic community to date.  
 
In short, rather than the immutable ‘bottom up’ variant postulated by many observers, the 
evidence presented here supports a ‘top down’ conception of civic community – but one whose 
components are influenced by political institutions at different rates and to different degrees. 
Democratization and democratic performance can be either positively or negatively influenced 
by changes in political institutions, but the rate of change will depend on which component of 
the civic community is investigated.  
 
Because some aspects of the civic community respond quickly to political change and 
others less so, what emerges is a hybrid level of ‘civicness’ determined in part by the current 
political system and in part by the previous one. This finding is not a new one to political 
science. Indeed, students of Soviet bloc countries during the communist era frequently observed 
that even totalitarian governments only had a limited influence on shaping political culture. What 
emerged in each country during the Cold War was a political culture combining previous 
national characteristics and communist influences.
46 As communism crumbled and new, 
democratic political systems took its place, scholars began to discover that contemporary East 
Central Europe is shaped both by communism and the transition to democracy.
47 Jonathan Grix 
and Paul Cooke make this observation with regard to East German identity.
48 William Mishler 
and Detlef Pollack, in their study of political attitudes in post-communist countries, distinguish 
between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ aspects of political culture, the former more immutable and the latter 
as dynamic as political institutions change.
49 My findings about the origins of civic community 
contribute to this more nuanced strand of literature.    
 
If communities are not equally civic in all respects, is there one component of the civic 
community that is particularly tied to democratic performance? The Central European case 
suggests that the component least easily shaped by political institutions – voluntary associations  
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– might be the most closely tied to satisfaction with democracy. In the decade since unification, 
Eastern Germans have had quite different assessments than westerners of the way in which their 
identical democratic institutions perform. Both citizens and elites in the eastern part of the 
country have been consistently less satisfied than their western counterparts with the functioning 
of democracy at both the national and the local level.
50 Similarly, East Central Europeans are 
less satisfied than their western neighbors with the way democracy works in their countries. (See 
Table 7) Since Eastern and Western Germans do not read the paper or vote in referenda at 
significantly different rates, these aspects of the civic community cannot be what make 
democracy ‘work.’ Because the differences in general election voter turnout across Germany are 
so small, they are also unlikely to explain this persistent pattern of differences in satisfaction 
with democracy.  
 
Thus Germans' varying involvement with voluntary associations appears the most likely 
aspect of the civic community to explain their diverging satisfaction with democracy. 
Furthermore, this factor can help explain why Easterners and Westerners express different 
assessments of the same national government. The concept of civic community suggests that 
because westerners are organized into voluntary associations, they can effectively voice their 
preferences and make demands on government. If the state responds, westerners are likely to 
think that democracy works. Because Easterners are less organized into such associations, in 
contrast, they are less likely to see democracy work for them.  
 
What policy implications emerge from these findings? The evidence presented here 
suggests that if the European Union is interested in promoting democracy, it should pay careful 
attention to the design of the formal institutions that can influence voter turnout, as such 
institutions have considerable influence over turnout and this influence manifests itself quite 
quickly. Newspaper readership is somewhat less responsive to political change than voter 
turnout, but the introduction of a free press – especially one that represents the concerns of all 
potential readers – can promote regular newspaper readership.  
 
In contrast, associational membership reacts more slowly to political change and as a 
result is difficult for those in favor of democracy to influence in the short run. This component of 
the civic community also seems to be the most important for democratic performance, however. 
The German experience makes clear that political institutions can shape the level of voluntary 
associations, albeit over the course of several decades. While four decades of communist rule in 
East Germany ultimately depressed associational membership there, studies of West German 
political culture report that although citizens there emerged from the Nazi dictatorship with a low 
propensity to join voluntary groups, they became increasingly involved over the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s.
51 Thus political institutions promoting voluntary group membership are still a worthy 
policy goal, although their effects may only be seen over the course of decades.  
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 Table 1: Average Voter Turnout in National Elections (1990-2004) 
 
Country Turnout 
Denmark 86.05% 
Austria 83.86% 
Slovakia 82.15% 
Germany – West  80.80% 
Czech Republic  77.85% 
Germany – East  75.05% 
Hungary 68.64% 
Poland 50.30% 
Switzerland 44.22% 
 
Notes: East-West European difference of means not statistically significant. 
East-West German difference of means significant at 90% confidence level, 2-tailed test. 
 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Electoral Turnout From 1945 to Date 
(Available at www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm).  
 
 
Table 2: Average Voter Turnout in National* Referenda  
(1945 – 2004 western Europe; 1990-2004 in Eastern Europe) 
 
Country Turnout 
Demark 72.2% 
Austria 72.1% 
Germany – East  56.1% 
Czech Republic  55.2% 
Germany – West  52.9% 
Switzerland 44.8% 
Poland 44.7% 
Hungary 36.3% 
Slovakia 32.4% 
 
Notes: * Germany has no national referenda, so German figures represent state level referenda 
East-West German figures not significantly different.  
East-West European figures significantly different at 90% confidence interval, 1-tail test. 
 
Sources: Outside of Germany: Research and Documentation Center on Direct Democracy, University of Geneva 
(Available at http://c2d.unige.ch/). German data complied by author from State Statistical Offices. For a complete 
list of German state statistical offices see www.destatis.de/wahlen/lwls.htm. 
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Table 3: Newspaper Readership in Germany 
 
  West East 
% of population reading a daily newspaper 
1996 
70.0% 74.8%
% of population reading a daily newspaper 
2001 
73.0% 71.7%
% of population reading a daily newspaper 
2004 
77.2% 71.8%
 
Notes: East-West German difference of means not statistically significant. 
 
Sources: 1997 data: Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Media-Analyse '97 (Available at 
http://www2.bdzv.de). 2001 data: Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Reichweiten in den alten Ländern 
leicht gestiegen (Available at www2.bdzv.de). 2004 data: E-mail from Anja Pasquay, Bundesverband Deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger. 
 
 
Table 4: Newspaper Circulation in Central Europe 
     
Country   Average Number of daily newspapers 
circulated  
per 1000 citizens (1996-7) 
Hungary 459 
Switzerland 369 
Germany (all)  307 
Denmark 307 
Austria 296 
Czech 254 
Slovak 246 
Poland 108 
 
Notes: No statistically significant East-West differences 
 
Sources: The data for 1996 come from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999 
(Available on-line at http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/yearbook/YBIndexNew.htm) and the data from 
1997 come from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, ‘Press: The Number of Titles and Circulation of Daily and Non-
Daily Newspapers’, (Available on-line at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=5057_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC).  
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Table 5: German Voluntary Group Membership 
 
 1990  1995*  2000*  2002* 
Sports Clubs West  28%  31.8% 33.9% 32.5%
Sports Clubs East  11%  10.3% 12.1% 12.7%
Secular Choirs 
West 
6%** 2.7%  2.6%  2.5% 
Secular Choirs East  1%**  0.3%  0.4%  0.3% 
 
Notes: *Berlin excluded from analysis as its data not disaggregated along East-West lines.  
**1990 figures include church choirs. 
East-West German difference of means statistically significant, 95% confidence interval, 2-tailed test. 
 
Sources: 1990 figures come from Noelle-Neumann,  Problems, p. 222. Other figures from Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 1996, 2000, 2003), Tables 
17.7, 17.14, and in 2003 17.16.1. 
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of Population in Sports Clubs 
 
Country Percentag
e 
Date
Austria 41.7%  2003
Denmark 36.7%  2003
Germany – West  32.5%  2002
Switzerland 29.1% 1988
Czech Republic  23.9%  1999
Germany – East   12.7%  2002
Hungary 4.6%  1990
Poland 1.0%  2002
Slovakia 6.0%  2003
 
Note: East-West European difference of means statistically significant, 95% confidence level, 2-tailed test. 
 
Sources: All countries except Switzerland and Hungary: Most recent statistical yearbooks, available from national 
statistical offices. Switzerland: Bundesamt für Statistik, Freizeit und Kultur: Mikrozensus 1988Grunddaten: 
Amtliche Statistik der Schweiz Nr. 305, (Bern: Bundesamt für Statistik, 1988), p. 38. Hungary: Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office, Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 1990 (Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1991), p. 
310.  
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Table 7:  
Percentage of Citizens Very or Fairly Satisfied with Democratic Performance (1995) 
 
Country Percent 
Satisfied 
Denmark 83% 
West Germany  67% 
Austria 63% 
East Germany  48% 
Czech Republic  41% 
Hungary 22% 
Slovakia 21% 
 
Notes: No data available for Switzerland. 
East-West difference of means significant, 95% confidence interval, 2-tailed test. 
 
Source: Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis’, in Pippa Norris 
(ed.),  Critical Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31-56. Data from p. 50.  
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